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EMPLOYERS’ VICARIOUS LIABILITY—WHERE ARE
WE NOW?
SARAH ARNELL*
Introduction
The recent decision of the Inner House of the Court of Session in the caseof Wilson v Exel UK Ltd (t/a Exel)1 has given the Scottish courts the
opportunity to demonstrate how they are going to treat the approach to the
application of vicarious liability of an employer for his employees’ wrongdo-
ings. This article traces the journey that the principle of vicarious liability has
taken since the early 1900s. It demonstrates how the leading House of Lords
decision of Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd2 was not the first occasion when the close
connection between the wrongdoing and the employment had been used to
impose vicarious liability. However, the emotive nature of the wrongdoing in
that case, sexual abuse, added to the significance of the renewed focus by the
House of Lords on close connection and the apparent move away from the
course of employment test with its ‘‘improper mode of doing authorised acts’’3
sub-test. The English courts have embraced this change of focus. This article
attempts to extract from the English decisions since Lister those elements in a
case that will point to a close connection such that it is fair and just to impose
vicarious liability. The Scottish courts, on the other hand, would appear to be
maintaining the link with the ‘‘traditional approach’’ of the course of
employment with the Inner House decision of Wilson v Exel UK Ltd (t/a Exel).
A difference in approach would appear to be forming. Close connection is the
very foundation of vicarious liability itself, but is it too broad a test on its own
to curb the floodgates of litigation in this area of the law? Applied alone,
there is a risk of the approach seen in the obiter remarks in the Scottish
decision of Sharp v Highland and Islands Fire Board.4 One alternative is to
define broadly those situations where a close connection will be held to exist,
and apply them to new cases. This appears to be what is generally happening
in England. The other alternative is to anchor the close connection test to the
traditional approach of course of employment and this is the more restrained
approach evident in the Inner House.
Vicarious liability before Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd
Atiyah5 identified three essential requirements for the creation of vicarious
liability. They are (1) a wrongful act or omission by a person (the wrongdoer);
* Robert Gordon University.
1 Wilson v Exel UK Ltd (t/a Exel) [2010] CSIH 35; 2010 S.L.T. 671.
2 Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22; [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1311.
3 See below, at ‘‘Vicarious Liability Before Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd’’.
4 Sharp v Highland and Islands Fire Board, 2005 S.L.T. 855.
5 Patrick S. Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts (London: Butterworths, 1967), p.3.
EMPLOYERS’ VICARIOUS LIABILITY—WHERE ARE WE NOW?244
(2) some relationship between the wrongdoer and the defender who is to be
held liable; and (3) some connection between the wrongdoing and that
relationship. Without all these factors, you have the general rule of delict
encapsulated in the maxim culpa tenet suos auctores; the personal liability of
the wrongdoer alone.
Where the relationship that exists between the wrongdoer and the defender
is that of employee and employer respectively, the test that the courts have
been using for over 100 years in order to establish whether the third
requirement is met, is that the servant must have committed the wrongdoing
‘‘in the course of his employment’’ or a similar form of this test. In order to
determine whether an employee’s delict or tort was committed by him in the
course of his employment, the courts have often chosen to apply a further test.
The court will ask whether the employee was doing an act he was authorised
to do albeit negligently or in an unauthorised manner. This may be referred to
as the improper mode test.
The position taken by the courts in England and Scotland up to the decision
of the House of Lords in Lister was not greatly dissimilar. An appropriate
starting point for Scotland might be the case of Kirby v National Coal Board.6
The Lord President Clyde,7 like judges8 in many cases decided prior to and
since this decision, warned that each case depends to a large extent on its own
particular facts. However, the Lord President felt that the various situations
that the courts are faced with in this type of case could be divided into four
general categories.9 The first category was where the master actually author-
ised the particular act. In such a situation the employer was ‘‘clearly’’10 liable
for the act. The second category is where the employer does work which he is
employed to do but does it in a way which his employer did not authorise and
would not have authorised had he known of it. The employer will still be
responsible. The third category is where the employee is employed to do a
particular job and does something which is outside the scope of that job or
class of job. The employer will not be liable for any wrongful act that is
committed by the employee at this time. The fourth category is where the
employee simply uses the opportunity that his employment gives him (whether
it be the place of his employment, the time or the tools of his employment) to
do something for his own purposes. If a delict is committed during this time
his employer will not be responsible. It is clearly the second category that
represents the improper mode test. The emphasis is on the employee doing
what he is employed to do but in an unauthorised way.
6 Kirby v National Coal Board, 1958 S.C. 514.
7 Kirby v National Coal Board, 1958 S.C. 514 at 532.
8 See for example Lord Thankerton in Canadian Pacific Railway Co v Lockhart [1942] A.C. 591
at 599.
9 Kirby v National Coal Board, 1958 S.C. 514, per Lord President Clyde at 532.
10 Kirby v National Coal Board, 1958 S.C. 514, per Lord President Clyde at 532.
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In the case of Kirby, an explosion in a mine injured the pursuer. The
explosion took place when an employee struck a match in order to light a
cigarette. The employee had gone to an area of the mine where there was
waste material in order to have a cigarette during an enforced cessation of his
work caused when repairs were required to be made to the machinery the
employee was working on. It was held that this was not a situation where the
employee was doing a job that he had been instructed to do and whilst doing
it, negligently lit a cigarette; so it was not an example of the employee doing
something he was authorised to do but in a way that was unauthorised. The
Lord President felt that what this workman did was in no way connected with
the work he was employed to do. The determining factors seemed to be that
the employee stopped the particular work he was doing, left the particular
place where he was working and went to a place where he was not entitled to
go and he went there for his own purposes and his own pleasure. The Lord
President in Kirby, after enunciating the four categories, then went on to say:
‘‘It is often difficult in the particular case to distinguish between the
second and the third of these situations, but the criterion is whether the
act which is unauthorised is so connected with acts which have been
authorised, that it may be regarded as a mode—although an improper
mode—of doing the authorised act, as distinct from constituting an
independent act for which the master would not be liable.’’11
It is at this point that English law and Scots law intertwine, because the Lord
President took his test to distinguish between the second and third category
from Salmond on the Law of Torts.12 Salmond had stated that an act was
deemed to be within the course of employment where it was a wrongful act
authorised by the employer or where it was a wrongful or unauthorised mode
of doing an act that was authorised by the employer.13 The Lord President had
focused however on what Salmond said following this categorisation of when
an employee was acting within the course of his employment. Salmond said:
‘‘But a master, as opposed to an employer of an independent contractor,
is liable even for acts which he has not authorised, provided that they are
so connected with acts which he has authorised that they may rightly be
regarded as modes—although improper modes—of doing them . . . On
the other hand if the unauthorised and wrongful act of the servant is not
so connected with the authorised act as to be a mode of doing it, but is an
11 Kirby v National Coal Board, 1958 S.C. 514, per Lord President Clyde at 533.
12 Salmond on the Law of Torts, edited by W.T.S. Stallybrass, 9th edn (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 1936), p.95.
13 Salmond on the Law of Torts, edited by R.F.V. Heuston, 16th edn (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 1973), p.474.
EMPLOYERS’ VICARIOUS LIABILITY—WHERE ARE WE NOW?246
independent act, the master is not responsible; for in such a case the
servant is not acting in the course of his employment, but has gone
outside of it.’’14
So for both jurisdictions there was an emphasis on the tort or delict being an
improper mode of doing an authorised act.
A well known example of this improper mode situation can be seen in the
case of Century Insurance Co Ltd v Northern Ireland Road Transport Board.15
Here the employee struck a match whilst he was transferring petrol from a
lorry to an underground tank and by doing so caused an explosion. The House
of Lords in Century found that the employee was doing the job he was
instructed to do—to watch over the delivery of the spirit into the tank and to
turn off the tap when the proper quantity had passed from the tanker—but
performed it in a negligent manner—by starting smoking and throwing away a
lighted match at the same time. The House of Lords in Century did not rely on
Salmond’s formulation but the judges did focus on the fact that the cigarette
was lit whilst physically in the middle of doing the job instructed and whilst
still doing the job instructed. The court took the view that the employee had
negligently carried out the duties he was employed to carry out.
The course of employment test, which at first glance might appear to be
fairly straightforward, with the addition of the sub-test of improper mode,
actually created an unnecessary complexity in the approach to the issue of
whether the employer should be vicariously liable for the wrongdoing of his
employee in a particular situation.16 The test has not been applied in the same
way across the board. This is partly because of its actual complexity, partly
because the courts have dealt with it as a question of fact when in reality it is a
mixture of fact and law17 and partly because central to this approach’s
application is determining what the employee was employed to do and this can
be described at varying levels of generality.18 It has also detracted attention
away from the fundamental criterion required for vicarious liability—a
sufficiently close connection between the wrongdoing and the employer/
employee relationship. This fundamental criterion is the very reason why the
law imposes vicarious liability between an employer and employee. The courts
reached a point where they had got so caught up with asking themselves
whether the wrongful act was an improper mode of doing an authorised act,
that they became distanced from the reason for the rule of vicarious liability
which in turn made it more difficult for the courts to determine when it was
14 Salmond on the Law of Torts, 16th edn, 1973, p.474.
15 Century Insurance Co Ltd v Northern Ireland Road Transport Board [1942] A.C. 509.
16 For support see Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts, 1967, p.172.
17 Lord Nicholls in Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2002] 3 W.L.R. 1913 at [24], recognises
that it is not a question of fact, but a ‘‘conclusion of law’’.
18 Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts, 1967, p.263.
EMPLOYERS’ VICARIOUS LIABILITY—WHERE ARE WE NOW? 247
just to impose vicarious liability. It was also recognised by Atiyah in 1967 that
the improper mode approach was not particularly suitable when the wrongdo-
ing was an intentional act as opposed to an act of negligence.19
Close connection before Lister
Not all cases, even before the House of Lords’ decision in Lister, where the
vicarious liability of an employer for the employee’s wrongful act was at issue,
have applied the improper mode test. Some of the courts, even before Lister,
focused on the need for a close connection between the job the employee is
employed to do and the wrongful act. This can be seen in the leading Scottish
‘‘detour’’ case of Williams v A&W Hemphill Ltd.20 The driver of a lorry was
employed to drive a number of boys from Benderloch to Glasgow. The boys
persuaded the driver to take a detour and it was whilst on this detour that the
driver’s negligence resulted in a serious accident. The House of Lords held
that the driver was acting in the course of his employment whilst on this
deviation. It was simply a connection to the employer’s business that Lord
Pearce, who gave the judgment, focused upon. Whether there was such a
connection depended upon whether the journey was a new and independent
journey or still part of the authorised journey.21 Where there was a detour, it
was a matter of degree as to whether the detour took the journey into the
realm of a new and independent journey from that which was authorised by
the employer. In this case the fact that the boys were still in the lorry and still
required to be taken to Glasgow seemed to weigh heavily with the House in
their decision that the lorry driver was still carrying out the job he was
employed to do and was not on a new and independent journey.22
In the cases of Bell v Blackwood Morton and Sons Ltd23 and Thomson v
British Steel Corp,24 rather than the word ‘‘connection’’ being used, there was
focus on whether the employee was employed to do the act during which the
delict occurred or whether the act was incidental to the employment.25
Admittedly in the case of Bell where the delict occurred as the employees were
descending a stair at the end of the working day in order to exit the
employer’s premises, the First Division relied heavily in their finding that
19 Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts, 1967, p.262. See also Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd
[2001] UKHL 22; [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1311, per Lord Clyde at [37] and Lord Millett at [69].
20 Williams v A&W Hemphill Ltd, 1966 S.C. (H.L.) 31.
21 The focus on a new independent journey as bringing the act outwith the course of
employment was taken from Storey v Ashton (1868–69) L.R. 4 Q.B. 476.
22 This focus on the lorry still containing its passengers has been criticised by Atiyah, Vicarious
Liability in the Law of Torts, 1967, pp.253, 254.
23 Bell v Blackwood Morton & Sons Ltd, 1960 S.C. 11.
24 Thomson v British Steel Corp, 1977 S.L.T. 26.
25 This terminology is used again after the Lister decision in cases such as Majrowski v Guy’s and
St Thomas’s NHS Trust [2006] UKHL 34; [2006] 3 W.L.R. 125 and Cumbria CC v Carlisle-Morgan
[2007] I.R.L.R. 314, as part of the close connection test.
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descending the stairs was an act within the scope of employment on the fact
that the employers had retained control of that particular act in order to
ensure it was done safely. However, Lord Sorn states that acts that fall within
the scope of employment include acts that are incidental to the employee’s
employments.26 In Thomson Lord Maxwell referred to Lord Sorn’s words in
Bell and stated that if what an employee was doing (whether it was travelling
from one place to another, or anything else) can properly be regarded as part
of or an incident of his work, then the employer is vicariously liable.27
Some English decisions have also dealt with the issue by looking to see if
there was a connection between the wrongful act and the employment rather
than or as well as asking whether it was an improper mode of doing an
authorised act.28 A particularly interesting decision is that of the Court of
Appeal in Fennelly v Connex South Eastern Ltd.29 Lord Justice Buxton, who
gave the leading judgment, felt that a broad view should be taken of what the
job of the employee was, of the acts he carried out, and of his authority to do
those acts. He seems to have foretold the wider view of course of employment
that the House of Lords ultimately took in Lister. In Fennelly, the employee, a
Mr Sparrow, was a ticket inspector. Lord Justice Buxton formulated his job as
being to deal with the public in relation to tickets and to interfere with their
progress if they did not produce a ticket. Mr Sparrow had asked to see the
plaintiff’s ticket and the plaintiff had refused. An argument followed. This, the
court felt, was all clearly within the course of Mr Sparrow’s employment. The
plaintiff then walked away. Mr Sparrow said something to the effect of, ‘‘I’ve
had enough of this’’ and then went after the plaintiff and placed him in a
neck-lock. Lord Justice Buxton felt that this was connected to the argument
over the ticket, particularly in light of Mr Sparrow’s comments just before the
neck-lock. The neck-lock ‘‘sprang directly’’30 out of the altercation in which Mr
Sparrow had asked to see the plaintiff’s ticket. It was, according to Buxton
L.J., all one incident. So although connection was not a test or approach
formally recognised by the courts, prior to Lister, it had been used as part of
the course of employment analysis.
Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd
The decision in the case of Lister, 34 years after Atiyah published his book on
vicarious liability, brought us back to the roots of vicarious liability.
26 Bell v Blackwood Morton & Sons Ltd, 1960 S.C. 11, per Lord Sorn at 26. Bell was followed in
the case of Peden v Strathclyde RC, 1995 G.W.D. 4–202 OH, where a proof before answer was
allowed on the basis that it was arguable that having regard to the employee’s duties, there was a
sufficient connection with the employment for the events to be incidental to it.
27 Thomson v British Steel Corp, 1977 S.L.T. 26, per Lord Maxwell at 28, 29.
28 For example, Heasmans v Clarity Cleaning Co [1987] I.R.L.R. 286; Irving v Post Office [1987]
I.R.L.R. 289; Harrison v Michelin Tyre Co Ltd [1985] 1 All E.R. 918.
29 Fennelly v Connex South Eastern Ltd [2001] I.R.L.R. 390.
30 Fennelly v Connex South Eastern Ltd [2001] I.R.L.R. 390, per Buxton L.J. at [18].
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The House of Lords recognised that if the third essential requirement of a
sufficiently close connection between the wrongdoing and the employer/
employee relationship can be established, the requirements for vicarious
liability can be made out such that it is just and fair to impose vicarious
liability, whether or not the act can neatly be termed an improper mode of
doing an authorised act. And so the House of Lords created a new test in the
sense that the focus was now more clearly to be on a close connection between
the wrongdoing and the employer/employee relationship rather than whether
it can be said that the employee was doing an act he was authorised to do in
an improper manner, but this test was clearly not new in itself.31 The reason
for the rule had now in fact become the rule.
The House of Lords in Lister found the defendant company vicariously
liable for the acts of sexual abuse that had been carried out by their employee
against children who had lived in the boarding annex of a school for boys with
emotional and behavioural difficulties. The boarding annex and school were
owned by the defendants and the employee was employed as a warden to look
after the boys at the annex. At first sight, this case appears to have expanded
the application of the course of employment test beyond all recognition.
Sexual abuse would, on the face of it, appear to be an independent act of the
employee quite unrelated to his job and something therefore for which the
employer should not be held liable. This was the position taken by the Court
of Appeal.32 The House of Lords does move away from the improper mode
test but on a wide view the general course of employment test has not been
displaced. The court just goes back to basics. The emotive and repulsive
nature of the act that the employee ‘‘performed’’ creates a smoke screen
behind which lies an application of the fundamental criterion of close
connection.
In reaching their decision, the Law Lords in Lister were heavily influenced
by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of Bazley v
Curry.33 The judgment of the court was delivered by McLaughlin J. The
defendants ran residential care facilities for children. The case involved the
sexual abuse of one of the children by an employee of the defendants. The
court found that the employers encouraged the employees to have a quasi-
parental relationship with the children. The focus on the connection between
the employment activity and the wrong, that had been recognised by Atiyah,
was brought again to the fore. Justice McLaughlin narrowed her focus to the
31 Lord Steyn in the Privy Council decision of Bernard v Attorney General of Jamaica [2004]
UKPC 47; [2005] I.R.L.R 398, observed that the decision in Lister emphasised the intense focus
required on the closeness of the connection.
32 Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd, Times, October 13, 1999. The Court of Appeal followed the case of T
v North Yorkshire CC [1999] I.R.L.R 98.
33 Bazley v Curry (1999) 174 D.L.R. (4th) 45 Supreme Court of Canada. The exception is
perhaps Lord Hobhouse who, in Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22; [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1311
at [60], says that Bazley provides useful social and economic reasons but he does not rely on it.
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risk that was created by the employment activity to justify the imposition of
vicarious liability on the employer. And along with the two primary policy
considerations which she identified as dominating this area of the law,
provision of a just and practical remedy and deterrence of future harm, used
these elements to justify the wider approach to vicarious liability than had
been adopted in the past. The case of Bazley formulates the question in a case
of vicarious liability to be—is there a connection between the enterprise and
the wrong that justifies vicarious liability, in terms of fair allocation of the
consequences of the risk the enterprise gave rise to, and/or deterrence?34
Justice McLaughlin impresses that the enterprise must significantly contribute
to the risk. Opportunity may or may not be enough, depending on the
circumstances.
Four of the five Law Lords35 in Lister focused on the close connection
between the employment and the act of the employee. They all refer to
Salmond’s statement that an act may be unauthorised but so closely connected
to the authorised act as to be an improper mode of doing the authorised act.
All four judges take a broad view of the job the warden was employed to carry
out. They found that the duty of the employee was to look after and care for
the boys in his charge. Whilst Lord Steyn and Lord Hutton focus on the fact
that the close connection is achieved because the warden was employed to
care for the boys and he committed the acts of sexual abuse whilst he was in
the process of caring for them, Lords Clyde and Millett in establishing the
sufficient connection between employment and the act, place greater emphasis
on the fact that the defendant company undertook to keep the boys safe and
delegated that duty to care for the boys to their employee.
Lord Hobhouse, in contrast, focuses singularly on the defendant company
entrusting their duty to care for the boys to their employee. The employee
owes this duty to his employer but also to the boys and he fails to fulfil this
duty when he sexually abuses the boys. His employer is vicariously liable for
this breach by the employee. Lord Hobhouse does not frame his reasoning
within the close connection vehicle that the other Law Lords focus upon. Lord
Hobhouse states that the talk of ‘‘connection’’36 simply indicates the ‘‘requisite
relationship’’37 between the act and the job the employee is employed to do.
Lord Hobhouse is of course correct. At the heart of the course of employment
test is the requirement for a connection between the delict or tort and the
employer/employee relationship such that justifies the imposition of vicarious
liability; Atiyah’s third requirement. Lord Hobhouse finds the ‘‘requisite
34 Bazley v Curry (1999) 174 D.L.R. (4th) 45 Supreme Court of Canada, per McLaughlin J. at
[37].
35 Lords Steyn, Clyde, Hutton (who did not give an individual judgment but concurred with
Lord Steyn) and Millett.
36 Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22; [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1311, per Lord Hobhouse at [59].
37 Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22; [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1311, per Lord Hobhouse at [59].
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relationship’’38 or the sufficient connection in this particular case because the
employee fails to fulfil the duty delegated to him by his employers. Because
the duty was delegated by the employers, the employers are liable for its
failure. But Lord Hobhouse goes too far when he says that the ‘‘fundamental
criterion’’39 in the correct approach is a comparison of the duties owed by the
servant to the plaintiff and the duties the servant owes to his employer.40 A
comparison of the duties works in this case because the close connection or
requisite relationship is based on the delegation of the duty. This is just one
way in which the close connection or requisite relationship can be established,
but as we are to see in cases decided after Lister, it is not the only way.
Another way of reasoning the decision of the House of Lords was
formulated by Atiyah back in 1967.41 At the same time as the warden was
performing the intentional act of sexually abusing the boys, he was also
negligently performing the authorised act of caring for the boys. The warden is
therefore acting within the scope of his employment. The beginning of this
approach can be seen in the judgments of Lords Hobhouse, Clyde and Millett
when they rely for their reasoning, in some part, on the duty to care for the
boys delegated to the warden and the warden’s obvious failure in this duty.
The Law Lords do not go as far as saying that the warden was negligently
performing an authorised act, but they begin to go down the road that would
lead to that conclusion. Only Lord Millett specifically states at the end of his
judgment that liability lies in the doing of the intentional act rather than the
failure to perform a duty to take care of the boys. This seems out of keeping
with the rest of his reasoning which, up until that point, appeared to be based
on a failure by the employee to fulfil the duties that were entrusted to him by
his employer.42 Moreover, the failure to perform a duty (and therefore
negligently performing an authorised act) is simply the other side of the same
coin. The close connection or requisite relationship is created by the fact that
the employee performed an act which amounted to a failure to fulfil a duty
that had been delegated to him by his employer. The failure in duty creates
the close connection in Lister. Lord Millett43 calls the duty approach an
artificial approach based on a misreading of Morris v CW Martin & Sons Ltd,44
but Salmon L.J. in Morris specifically refers to the negligence of the employee
and the tort of conversion as the ‘‘two causes of action’’ and Rosalind Coe45
38 Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22; [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1311, per Lord Hobhouse at [59].
39 Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22; [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1311, per Lord Hobhouse at [60].
40 See C.A. Hopkins, ‘‘What is the course of employment?’’ (2001) 60(3) C.L.J. 458, 460.
41 Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts, 1967, pp.264, 265. According to Atiyah, this
type of reasoning was used in a number of cases to justify the imposition of vicarious liability.
42 See Rosalind Coe, ‘‘A new test for vicarious liability?’’ (2001) 151(6995) N.L.J. 1154.
43 Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22; [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1311, per Lord Millett at [84].
44 Morris v CW Martin & Sons Ltd [1966] 1 Q.B. 716, per Salmon L.J. at 738.
45 Coe, ‘‘A new test for vicarious liability?’’ (2001) 151(6995) N.L.J. 1154. See also Atiyah,
Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts, 1967, p.265.
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suggests that just as the employee may be guilty of criminal as well as tortious
conduct, a person may be guilty of two types of tortious conduct simultaneously.
The decision in Lister showed that there is more than one way to achieve
the necessary close connection. Although not all the judges specifically
founded their decision on this, the close connection could be said to exist
because the duty that the employee breached was a duty that had been
delegated to him by his employer. This delegation created the close connec-
tion in this particular case. The crucial duty, i.e. the duty that was breached,
stemmed from the employer in this case. In cases where the crucial duty began
and finished with the employee (where the wrongful act of the employee is
unintentional, for example where the employee committed an act of negli-
gence against an individual) there will need to be something else that creates
the sufficient connection. In those types of cases, the requisite close connec-
tion will exist where it can be said that the act was an improper way of
performing an authorised act. So Lister should not be taken to replace the
improper mode test with the close connection test. Rather the close connec-
tion test should be taken to be the primary test which can be satisfied in a
number of ways. Improper mode is one way, delegated duty is another. In the
words of Lord Millett in Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam46:
‘‘An employer has been held to be vicariously liable for the intentional
wrongdoing of his employee in a wide variety of different circumstances.
In some of the cases the employer has undertaken a duty towards the
plaintiff and then delegated the performance of that duty to his
employee: see Morris v C W Martin & Sons Ltd [1966] 1 QB 716; Photo
Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827; Lister v Hesley
Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215. The decisive factor in Lloyd v Grace Smith &
Co [1912] AC 716 was that the employee who committed the fraud for his
own benefit was the person to whom his employer invited the client to
entrust her affairs. In all those cases the plaintiff was a client or customer
of the employer. But that is not essential. It was not the case in Hamlyn v
John Houston & Co [1903] 1 KB 81. The decisive feature in that case was
that, in paying the bribe, the partner was merely using an improper means
of obtaining information for his firm which it was his job to obtain. But
the circumstances in which an employer may be vicariously liable for his
employee’s intentional misconduct are not closed. All depends on the
closeness of the connection between the duties which, in broad terms, the
employee was engaged to perform and his wrongdoing.’’
Post-Lister in the English courts
The effect that the decision of Lister had on how the application of vicarious
liability is focused cannot be more clearly seen than when the pre-Lister case
46 Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2002] 3 W.L.R. 1913, per Lord Millett at [129]. The
House of Lords applied the test of close connection that had been honed in Lister and found a
firm of solicitors vicariously liable for the fraudulent acts of one of their partners.
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of Daniels v Whetstone Entertainments47 is compared with the post-Lister case
of Mattis v Pollock (t/a Flamingos Nightclub).48
Both cases involved the acts of a doorman. In Daniels, there was an
argument on a dance floor and the doorman became involved. The doorman
was assaulted by one of the patrons of the dancehall and then whilst trying to
remove the plaintiff from the dancehall, the doorman then assaulted the
plaintiff whom he believed to be the person who had assaulted him. By the
time the manager was called the doorman was outside. The manager ordered
the doorman to return inside. The doorman refused and then when he saw the
plaintiff outside, minding his own business, he assaulted him again. The Court
of Appeal found that the doorman’s duties were to keep order in the ballroom
and to eject any persons who were causing trouble, if necessary by the use of
reasonable force. They held that the first assault by the doorman was carried
out in the course of ejecting the plaintiff but that the second assault, when the
plaintiff was outside and showing no signs of wanting to re-enter the
dancehall, was not within the scope of employment and was an act of private
retaliation. The court had relied on the by now well known passage from
Salmond on Torts, focusing on the question of whether the actions of the
doorman could be taken to be wrongful modes of doing something that the
doorman was employed to do.
This is to be contrasted with Mattis. The case involved a nightclub bouncer
who was encouraged to use violent and aggressive behaviour in controlling
customers. The nightclub bouncer assaulted the plaintiff. The assault was the
culmination of a series of events that occurred after the plaintiff’s friend was
barred from the nightclub by the bouncer. In the scuffle that took place after
the friend was prevented from entering the club, the bouncer had found
himself outnumbered. He went to his flat which was near to the club and
returned a short time after, armed with two knives. When he was about 100
metres from the club, he came upon the plaintiff and the others with whom he
had been involved in the scuffle. The bouncer ran up to the plaintiff and
stabbed him in the spinal cord.
The Court of Appeal in Mattis had the decisions of Lister and Dubai
Aluminium before it. From these cases, the court drew the ‘‘deceptively
simple’’49 question of whether the assault was so closely connected with what
the doorman’s employer had authorised or expected of him, that it would be
fair and just to conclude that the employer was vicariously liable for the harm
sustained. Following Dubai Aluminium, the court clearly rejected any restric-
tions on the close connection test based on arguments such as that the act was
47 Daniels v Whetstone Entertainments [1962] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 1.
48 Mattis v Pollock (t/a Flamingos Nightclub) [2003] EWCA Civ 887; [2003] 1 W.L.R. 2158. See
further Paul T. Rose, ‘‘The evolution of vicarious liability in tort in respect of deliberate
wrongdoing’’ (2009) 3 J. P. I. Law 179.
49 Mattis v Pollock (t/a Flamingos Nightclub) [2003] EWCA Civ 887; [2003] 1 W.L.R. 2158, per
Judge L.J. at [19].
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for the employee’s own benefit or an act of self indulgence, and it specifically
stated that where an employee was expected to use violence, the likelihood of
establishing that an act of violence fell within the broad scope of his
employment was greater than it would be if he were not.50 The court held that
the stabbing was directly linked to the incident that had taken place in the
club. This was particularly emphasised by the words the bouncer used as he
stabbed the plaintiff, to the effect that what he was about to do (i.e. the
stabbing), would teach the plaintiff not to mess with him. The court said it was
approaching the matter broadly and that even although there was an element
of personal revenge, the responsibility of the employer for the actions of the
bouncer was not extinguished. This broad approach, we have already seen, had
been followed by the Court of Appeal in the pre-Lister case of Fennelly.51
The application of the close connection test has clearly expanded the effect
of vicarious liability. This can be further seen in the case of Bernard v Attorney
General of Jamaica52 where the defendant was held to be vicariously liable for
the actions of an off-duty police officer who had used his position to try to
queue jump and then shot the claimant in the head. The police officer had
then arrested the claimant when he awoke in hospital and handcuffed him to
the bed. In this case, the close connection test is applied by the Privy Council
along with the just and reasonable consideration. The Privy Council rely quite
heavily on the creation of risk by the defendant in allowing off-duty constables
to take loaded revolvers home and carry them while off duty as a base upon
which to structure the vicarious liability in this case. This together with the
evidence that the constable had purported to act as a policeman just before he
shot the plaintiff (there was a purported assertion of police authority
immediately before the shooting and the police officer arrested Bernard in
hospital), created the sufficient close connection. The court does clearly seek
to align the acts within the course of the man’s employment so as to
distinguish the case from that where the employment merely creates
opportunity.
Whilst the close connection test has been brought to the forefront of
vicarious liability and its application has expanded the range of acts for which
an employer may be made vicariously liable there has, from the beginning,
been a clear recognition that mere opportunity to commit the wrongdoing
created by the employment, will not per se be sufficient to establish vicarious
liability.53 An example is the Privy Council decision of Attorney General of the
British Virgin Islands v Hartwell.54 This case also involved the actions of a
50 Mattis v Pollock (t/a Flamingos Nightclub) [2003] EWCA Civ 887; [2003] 1 W.L.R. 2158, per
Judge L.J. at [25].
51 Fennelly v Connex South Eastern Ltd [2001] I.R.L.R. 390.
52 Bernard v Attorney General of Jamaica [2004] UKPC 47; [2005] I.R.L.R 398.
53 See McLaughlin J. in Bazley v Curry (1999) 174 D.L.R. (4th) 45 Supreme Court of Canada;
and Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22; [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1311.
54 Attorney General of the British Virgin Islands v Hartwell [2004] UKPC 12; [2004] 1 W.L.R.
1273.
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police officer. In Hartwell, the police officer abandoned his post, took a
revolver from a strongbox in the police station and went to a bar where his
girlfriend was working. He fired four shots and seriously injured a tourist.
Lord Nicholls, giving the judgment for the Privy Council, dealt with this aspect
of the case succinctly:
‘‘From first to last, from deciding to leave the island of Jost Van Dyke to
his use of the firearm in the bar of the Bath & Turtle, Laurent’s activities
had nothing whatever to do with any police duties, either actually or
ostensibly. Laurent deliberately and consciously abandoned his post and
his duties. He had no duties beyond the island of Jost Van Dyke. He put
aside his role as a police constable and, armed with the police revolver he
had improperly taken, he embarked elsewhere on a personal vendetta of
his own. That conduct falls wholly within the classical phrase of ‘a frolic of
his own’’’.55
The factors that had been put forward to support a close connection—the fact
that Laurent was on duty; that his jurisdiction extended to the area where the
bar was; and that it was a police revolver he had used—were dismissed as
insufficient. The difference between this case and Bernard, is that Hartwell
never purported to act as a police officer and he did not seek to abuse the
position of authority his employment gave him.
The application of the close connection test to these police cases, it is
suggested, correctly attributes liability to the defendant when the connection
to the employment (by virtue of whatever factors, including the risk of harm
created by the employment) is strong enough to justify vicarious liability, and
refuses to impose it when the connection is mere opportunity and any risk that
is created by the circumstances of the employment and then realised by the
wrongdoer, contributes only to the opportunity created rather than to the
substance of the wrongdoing. However, the position a police officer holds is, it
is suggested, particularly prone to abuse because of the position of trust that a
police officer holds in relation to the public. In that respect, it has similar
elements to the position of a warden in a children’s home. Abuse of that trust
is an inherent risk in the position.
In contrast to Hartwell, in the case of N v Chief Constable of Merseyside56 the
wrongdoer did purport to act as a police officer. The fine line between mere
opportunity and sufficient connection is clearly demonstrated here. The police
officer was off duty, sitting in his own car outside a nightclub, but having been
on duty earlier, was still in his uniform. He asked a first aider from the
nightclub if he was okay, as he saw that the first aider was trying to help the
55 Attorney General of the British Virgin Islands v Hartwell [2004] UKPC 12; [2004] 1 W.L.R.
1273, per Lord Nicholls at [17].
56 N v Chief Constable of Merseyside [2006] EWHC 3041 (QB)
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claimant who was clearly heavily intoxicated. The first aider expressed his
concerns for the claimant. The police officer told the first aider he would ‘‘sort
it’’ and told the claimant, ‘‘I am the police’’ when she sat in his car. He then
showed her his badge and reiterated, ‘‘I am the police’’. He then told the first
aider that he would take the claimant to the police station. The police officer
in fact drove past a number of police stations, took the claimant to his house
and raped her.
Although s.88(1) of the Police Act 1996 applied, the vicarious liability in
that section is stated to apply, ‘‘as a master is liable in respect of torts
committed by his servants in the course of their employment’’ which brings
into application the close connection test. Mr Justice Nelson in the High
Court, felt that the police officer had merely used his uniform and position as
the opportunity to commit the assaults. He did not owe a specific duty to care
for the claimant, that had been entrusted to him by his employer (delegated
duty), as in Lister, and he was not, purporting to perform a police function
such as arrest, or enforcing police authority as in Bernard. So no close
connection was created. Mr Justice Nelson was also influenced in his decision
by policy considerations; there simply was not a close enough connection such
that it would be fair and just to hold the defendants vicariously liable. Yes
there was a connection—opportunity—but in Nelson J.’s mind, one not
sufficiently strong enough to justify vicarious liability. The flaw in Nelson J.’s
position however is that he failed to deal with the fact that the position the
police officer held in the community particularly allowed him to engender the
trust of the plaintiff and abuse that trust, as it had for the employee in Lister.
One has to question whether the risk of abuse of trust in this type of
employment was not such as to create a close enough connection that it was
just and reasonable to find vicarious liability? Or did this situation fall on the
same side of the line as the other Canadian case of Jacobi v Griffiths57 where
the majority of the Supreme Court found that the employment (an employee
at a children’s recreational club) had merely provided the opportunity for G to
develop a rapport with the children that he subsequently sexually abused. Did
the risk, in both cases, contribute only to the opportunity created, rather than
to the substance of the wrongdoing? It is the employment creating the
position of trust and the risk that the employee abuses that trust that,
arguably, creates a connection that is close enough for it to be just and
reasonable to fix upon the employer vicarious liability for abuse of that trust.
In Jacobi, it is arguable that the employment does not merely create
opportunity in such terms as time and physical place. Rather, it creates the
substantial emotional dependence or trust that is needed to commit wrongdo-
ings such as abuse.58 Although this is not needed for rape, as physical presence
57 Jacobi v Griffiths (1999) 174 D.L.R (4th) 71.
58 For support see the dissenting opinion of McLaughlin J. in Jacobi v Griffiths (1999) 174
D.L.R (4th) 71. She felt that the employee’s fostering of trust at the club, which flowed from the
requirement of the job that he forge bonds of intimacy and respect, enabled him to commit the
acts.
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is enough, the position of trust provided the physical opportunity. Mr Justice
Nelson put N v Chief Constable of Merseyside on the side of the line of
opportunity, but the circumstances of the case create something more than
just opportunity. The off-duty police officer was purporting to perform a
police function, in the minds and eyes of the first aider and the intoxicated
club-goer in the lead up to the wrongdoing (so the case is similar to Bernard)
and there was a high degree of risk of abuse of his position, as there was in
Lister and Mattis v Pollock. It is suggested that there was enough in N v Chief
Constable of Merseyside to establish a close enough connection for it to be fair
and just to impose vicarious liability.59
The decision of N v Chief Constable of Merseyside starkly highlights how the
new emphasis on close connection that has become the new test for vicarious
liability amounts to a policy decision. But although Lister expanded the
situations where vicarious liability will be established, there is still needed a
strong connection between the wrong and the employment. Past decisions
have shown that it may be delegated duty; or it may be the actions of the
wrongdoer being in purported exercise of the employment, together with an
increased risk of harm, that creates the sufficient connection. Increased risk of
harm alone has, in some circumstances, even been enough to establish
vicarious liability, such as in Mattis and also the decision of Gravil v Carroll.60
But the case of N v Chief Constable of Merseyside has rejected the argument
that the creation of a high degree of risk that the employee will abuse the trust
and authority engendered by his employment, is enough to establish a close
connection. This is because it can be categorised as merely the creation of an
opportunity, but this ignores the additional factors of abuse of trust and
authority engendered by the employment which, it is arguable, creates a close
enough connection that it is fair and just to find vicarious liability. The
existence of such an element could potentially be the next ground on which
the courts find a close enough connection that justifies vicarious liability.61 It
sits somewhere between mere opportunity and the now established situations
of improper mode; delegated duty; purported exercise of the employment;
59 See Max Loubser and Elspeth Reid, ‘‘Vicarious Liability for Intentional Wrongdoing: After
Lister and Dubai Aluminium in Scotland and South Africa’’, 2003 Jur. Rev. 143, 157, for support
for a category of vicarious liability where the delict has been perpetrated by abuse of authority or
trust.
60 Gravil v Carroll [2008] EWCA Civ 689; [2008] I.R.L.R 829, where the Court of Appeal found
that a punch to the face that was given after the final whistle in a rugby match, but just following a
scrum whilst there was still a melee which was part of the game, was very closely connected to the
employment such that it would be fair and just to impose vicarious liability. In this case, the
player had a contract of employment to play rugby for the club. There was an express provision in
the contract that players must not physically assault an opponent so it was a breach of an express
term of the contract. However the court approached the question of vicarious liability almost
exclusively by the close connection test and the creation of risk.
61 See Loubser and Reid, ‘‘Vicarious Liability for Intentional Wrongdoing’’, 2003 Jur. Rev. 143,
157 for support of a third category of vicarious liability, one which accommodates cases where the
delict has been perpetrated by abuse of authority or trust.
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and, sometimes increase in risk of harm. Just as close connection has moved
from being the reason for the rule to the rule itself, so too the creation of risk
could move from being the reason for the rule to a formulation of the rule
itself.62 This may suggest a greater desire by the courts to reflect the policy and
reasoning more strongly in the decision itself.
The Scottish reaction to Lister
The case of Wilson v Exel UK Ltd (t/a Exel),63 in the Inner House of the Court
of Session, gave the court the opportunity to demonstrate its approach to
vicarious liability of an employer in light of the decision of Lister. Here the
pursuer averred a case of negligence on the part of the defenders, Exel, whom
she said was vicariously liable for the acts of Reid who was employed by Exel
as a supervisor and who also was given responsibility for health and safety.
Reid was averred to have pulled the pursuer’s ponytail tightly and pulled her
head back as far as it would go, causing her injury. The basis of the pursuer’s
case seems to be taken from Lord Hobhouse’s judgment in Lister. It was
averred that the employer had assumed a duty of care towards the pursuer;
that duty had been delegated to Reid as supervisor; and the close connection
existed because the duty that Reid had breached was a duty that had been
delegated to him by his employer. This delegated duty route, it was argued,
meant that the motive of the employee and the fact that he was serving his
own ends, did not negative the vicarious liability.
Lord Carloway held that the main approach was whether the employee’s
actions were so closely connected with his employment that it would be fair
and just to hold the defenders vicariously liable. He then referred to the, ‘‘well
established and fundamental principle’’64 of finding vicarious liability when the
actings were within the scope of the employee’s employment. He said that this
principle was, ‘‘within the context of the broad test’’.65 He quoted Salmond’s
well known words66 and then Lord Clyde in Lister where Lord Clyde says:
‘‘The sufficiency of the connection may be gauged by asking whether the
wrongful actings can be seen as ways of carrying out the work which the
employer had authorised.’’67
Lord Carloway goes on to state that Lord Clyde in Lister also emphasised the
importance of the traditional approach. He then refers to a number of cases
62 See Loubser and Reid, ‘‘Vicarious Liability for Intentional Wrongdoing’’, 2003 Jur. Rev. 143
at 155 which discusses the different approaches to the risk theory by Scottish and South African
courts.
63 Wilson v Exel UK Ltd (t/a Exel) [2010] CSIH 35; 2010 S.L.T. 671.
64 Wilson v Exel UK Ltd (t/a Exel) [2010] CSIH 35; 2010 S.L.T. 671, per Lord Carloway at [25].
65 Wilson v Exel UK Ltd (t/a Exel) [2010] CSIH 35; 2010 S.L.T. 671, per Lord Carloway at [25].
66 Wilson v Exel UK Ltd (t/a Exel) [2010] CSIH 35; 2010 S.L.T. 671, per Lord Carloway at [26].
67 Wilson v Exel UK Ltd (t/a Exel) [2010] CSIH 35; 2010 S.L.T. 671 at [27].
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where the use of violence takes place whilst the employee is engaged in a task
associated with his duties: Mattis; Gravil; and Bernard. He contrasts these with
the case in hand where when Reid pulled the pursuer’s ponytail, he was not
purporting to do anything connected with his duties either relating to health
and safety or in relation to his role as a supervisor. Reid was engaged on a
‘‘frolic’’68 of his own. He was not entrusted to look after the pursuer in the way
that rendered the defendants liable in Lister. Lord Carloway thereby considers
the application to the case of delegated duty, improper mode and a purported
exercise of the duties of the job, but feels that none is relevant in the
circumstances. He concludes by saying that either way, whether the general
test of close connection and what is fair and just or whether the more specific
criterion of scope of employment is applied, the pursuer’s case fails.
Accordingly, the Inner House has not taken the opportunity to use Lister to
sweep away the traditional test of scope of employment and the court retained
the link to an improper mode of doing an authorised act or ‘‘ways of carrying
out the work which the employer has authorised’’.69 This is now seen as part of
the broader test of close connection which is closely tied up with policy
through the additional fair and reasonable requirement. The court felt that
both the general and specific test failed to establish vicarious liability in this
case. A frolic of the employee’s own will still not create vicarious liability in
Scotland, even although the test for establishing vicarious liability has no
doubt been expanded by Lister. However the Inner House has shown that this
expansion will not easily be established and that the traditional approach
which has now been placed within the umbrella of close connection, thereby
stretching that which can be encompassed by it, is still as valid as ever.
The fact that the Inner House has had an opportunity to pass judgment on
the current approach to vicarious liability is a welcome clarification of the
Scottish position, because it will emphasise to lower Scottish courts that the
Lister close connection test is not to be applied to the exclusion of the
consideration of the course of employment test, contrary to the approach that
the Lord Ordinary took in his obiter remarks in the case of Sharp v Highlands
and Islands Fire Board.70 The course of employment test exists within the
68 Wilson v Exel UK Ltd (t/a Exel) [2010] CSIH 35; 2010 S.L.T. 671, per Lord Carloway at [34];
cf. Green v DB Group Services (UK) Ltd [2006] EWHC 1898 (QB), where the treatment of the
plaintiff by fellow employees was taken to be so closely connected to the nature of the
employment that it was fair and just to impose vicarious liability. In this case some of the
wrongful actions involved wrongful ways of doing the employee’s job, for example, omitting the
claimant from internal circulation lists; failing to deliver any internal mail to the claimant all
week, until Friday afternoon. The test applied was close connection alone, although the close
connection was justified because, ‘‘some aspects of the behaviour involved work that one or other
of the women were required to undertake in the course of their employment’’ (per Owen J. at
[101]).
69 Wilson v Exel UK Ltd (t/a Exel) [2010] CSIH 35; 2010 S.L.T. 671, per Lord Carloway at [27],
quoting Lord Clyde in Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22; [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1311.
70 Sharp v Highlands and Islands Fire Board, 2005 S.L.T. 855.
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context of the broader close connection test and both are to be kept in mind
when determining vicarious liability. It is unlikely that the Inner House would
have agreed with the obiter remarks of the Lord Ordinary in Sharp. The Lord
Ordinary simply applied the close connection test without any link with the
course of employment consideration or the improper mode of employment
sub-test. He then listed a number of considerations which led him to the view
that playing in a football match that was traditionally played at the end of a
course which the defenders had insisted employee’s attend, was an action that
was so closely connected with the employment that it would be fair and just to
hold them vicariously liable for the employee’s actions during the match.
These considerations amounted to the employee still being an employee whilst
he was on the course; that the employer would have expected the employee to
take part in the match; and the employer had not opposed the employee
playing in the match. Taking a generous view, it can be argued that this
situation can just about be said to be closely connected to the employment but
it is harder to say that the act that was done was within the scope of the
employee’s employment. It is hard to see how the Inner House’s approach
would have come to the same conclusion as the Lord Ordinary. The Inner
House has shown that even in new circumstances of liability, the close
connection test will still be bound up with the traditional test, as it always has
been since the time of Salmond. The course of employment is the anchor to
the close connection test.
Conclusion
From an analysis of the cases since Lister, it is clear that the Inner House of
the Court of Session is taking a more incremental and cautious step in terms
of their application of the close connection test than the courts south of the
border. The Inner House is taking a more pronounced approach of keeping
the close connection test anchored to the course of employment test, rather
than taking the close connection test as a stand alone test. The difference in
approach is subtle but there is no doubt that the latter allows a far freer reign
in finding vicarious liability as can be seen in Sharp v Highlands and Islands
Fire Board. But despite the slightly less restrained approach south of the
border, the courts there are still looking for more than mere opportunity.
Close connection has been shown to exist where there has been a delegated
duty and also where there has been a purported exercise of the employee’s
position, as well as the established situation where the wrongdoing can be
considered as a way of doing the work authorised by the employer (improper
mode). The creation of a high risk of harm will strengthen the argument for
vicarious liability as a policy consideration, but it has at times been enough in
itself to satisfy the close connection and impose vicarious liability. The
creation of a high risk of abuse of the trust or authority created by the
employment has, so far, not been enough to establish the close connection. It
will be interesting to see whether the English courts develop this ground of
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close connection and particularly interesting to see if the initial signs of a
divergence in approach between Scotland and England are confirmed and
developed further. It is perhaps too early to say how these differing
approaches will each shape vicarious liability in each jurisdiction, but they
both represent ways of containing the potentially broad close connection test.

